CLIMATE CHANGE AND HUMAN SECURITY – A CHALLENGING ENVIRONMENT OF INJUSTICE

A Report by the Mission and Public Affairs Council

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Chapter One
Overview: Climate Change – A New Strategic Priority

1. No one now seriously disputes the overwhelming scientific evidence that indicates that climate change is a serious global threat, which demands an urgent global response. **What is new is that governments are increasingly treating climate change as a security threat.** The British government has played a key role in pressing for the incorporation of climate change into mainstream security and diplomatic planning. What appears radical at first is increasingly being seen as the norm. The clearest example of this was the April 2007 UN Security Council debate where most countries speaking accepted the link between climate change and security, even if they could not agree on consensus language on either specific threats or conflicts.

2. The changing nature of the debate has been influenced by a range of factors. The social and economic dislocation caused by Hurricane Katrina to the city of New Orleans in August 2005 underlined how even in a country as wealthy and resilient as America, the social and economic dislocation caused by such a climatic catastrophe can place huge strains on a government’s ability to provide for its citizens. Moreover, in more vulnerable regions such as Africa and South Asia, or more strategically important regions like the Middle East, the economic and security impacts of extreme climatic events may be even more dramatic. **In an interdependent world, governments are increasingly aware that the impacts will be felt not just in the immediate region affected, but also across the international community.**

3. The ‘climate security’ debate is developing along two fronts. First, the general debate on climate security flows from the recognition that climate change is a serious collective security challenge to all countries. The intended audience comprises the public, politicians, climate experts and to a lesser extent security actors. The debate is focused on how the foundations of broadly defined human security are threatened by climate change, as it undermines the pillars of prosperity: water security, energy security, food security and climate security. The main aim of this debate is to galvanise greater urgency in mitigating the drivers of climate change and, to a lesser extent, to increase action to adapt to climate change.

4. The second, narrower debate focuses on the challenges climate change poses to the interests and objectives of the broadly defined ‘security community’, and addresses how they must change to respond to them. This is not about securitising climate change or about putting generals in charge of policy. Climate change poses many hard security challenges, but there are no hard security solutions. Rather, it is a reflection of the fact that the security sector, which comprises a diverse range of actors (diplomatic, military, intelligence, policing, peace-building, development and humanitarian actors) need to incorporate climate change into their already complex and challenging agendas.
5. This report aims to examine what this new agenda means for the Church. It does not attempt to provide a comprehensive guide to the theology, science, economics and business of climate change. There are more authoritative and comprehensive reports which do that. It does not give detailed examination of how climate change might impact on particular countries or conflicts. Neither does it set out what a definitive version of climate security might be – a term which is subject to numerous and sometimes competing interpretations. **Rather, this report examines what steps the Church needs to take in order to influence the general debate on climate change, a debate which is increasingly framed in security terms as much as in environmental terms. The report also examines how the Church, as part of the loosely defined security sector, by virtue of its peace-building and humanitarian work, can consider how to factor climate change considerations into that work.**

6. Such an approach is not without risks. The development community have generally resisted the language of security on the grounds that, as with the post 9/11 rhetoric of the ‘War on Terror’, the strategic thrust of any security debate will generate short-term and at times confused policy responses. We acknowledge that all too often security is framed in language and ideas that prioritise the interest of the state in meeting external threats, such as armed aggression, which reflects the fact that in the context of climate change security needs to be as much peopled-centred as state-centred. ‘Human security’ and ‘state security’ are not mutually exclusive concepts - without human security traditional state security cannot be achieved and vice versa. Using the language of human security in relation to climate change stresses that the proper referent for security should be the individual as part of a wider community rather than the state as an entity in and of itself.

7. Environmentalists draw attention to another risk – that securitising climate change will result in a misguided anthropocentrism that privileges human beings above the environment within which they developed and exist. This report guards against that danger by acknowledging from the outset that providing for human security is only achievable as part of a wider strategy of sustainable development. **The report therefore recognises explicitly the interconnectedness and interdependence of God’s creation and humanity’s relationship with the wider environment.** Moreover, it is important that environmentalists do address the potentially high costs of social breakdown from climate change, and avoid an unrealistically high level of optimism about the potential for international co-operation.

8. To summarise, the primary aim of this report is to resource the General Synod debate on how the Church of England addresses the current public policy issues related to climate change. **The report recognises that there are important theological issues which also need to be debated, but since that would require a substantially longer report, that must be for another occasion. The report is informed, however, theologically by past General Synod debates on climate change, in particular the 2006 debate on Sharing God’s Planet, as well as by past statements on this issue. The Mission and Public Affairs Council welcome and encourage continuing theological**
discussion and debate, particularly with regard to creation theology and missiology.

9. This report proceeds in three parts. First, it looks at the ways in which climate change is already affecting some of the poorest and most vulnerable communities around the world. It shows that in some places it is undermining the international community’s efforts to reduce extreme poverty. Progress towards achieving the Millennium Development Goals will be hindered by climate change. The fight against poverty eradication and the fight against the effects of climate change are therefore interrelated. Success must be achieved on both fronts jointly.

10. Second, the report examines the international responsible to climate change. We shall see from the progress, or lack of progress, made in the areas of mitigation and adaptation, that the issue of justice is at the heart of the negotiations for securing a robust post-2012 international climate change agreement. Unless the question of what constitutes a just and equitable settlement is addressed head on the chances of securing a far reaching settlement are slim. Highlighting the centrality of climate justice to the post-2012 negotiations is yet further evidence of how the climate agenda is increasingly being framed in non-environmental terms.

11. The report concludes by making positive and practical suggestions as to how the Church might respond to these developments. These include the following recommendations:

- **Recommendation 1**: Request that the Mission and Public Affairs Division and the Communications Unit work together in developing an integrated communications strategy for the Archbishops’ Council on climate change that helps sustain and promote future work in this area.

- **Recommendation 2**: Request that dioceses review their existing climate change work and take all necessary steps to encourage greater collaboration between relevant diocesan officers/networks.

- **Recommendation 3**: Request that the Archbishops’ Council explore the feasibility of becoming a corporate member of the Stop Climate Chaos campaign for an initial period of three years with the option for continued membership for a further three years following an evaluation of the work of Stop Climate Chaos.

- **Recommendation 4**: Welcome and endorse the steps taken so far by the Mission and Public Affairs Division to establish a Church adaptation scheme and request that the General Synod be kept informed of subsequent progress.
12. A major driver in shifting international opinion on climate change was the detailed analysis provided by the 2006 Stern Report on the economics of climate change. This Report underlined the magnitude of the problem and the scale of the challenges involved in managing the transition to a low carbon economy and in ensuring that societies can adapt to the consequences of climate change that can no longer be avoided. The Report concluded that adapting to the consequences could no longer be avoided. The Stern Commission envisaged that the future cost to the global economy of inaction on climate change could be as much as 20% of GDP, whereas, the economic cost of tackling the issue head on could be limited to between 1-5% of GDP. The benefits of strong, early action on climate change far outweigh the costs.

13. The Stern Commission underlined the stark societal and economic dislocation which would result from following a ‘business as usual’ model:

Our actions over the coming few decades could generate risk of major disruption to economic and social activity, later in this century and in the next, on a scale similar to those associated with the great wars and the economic depression of the first half of the 20th century. And it will be difficult or impossible to reverse these changes. Tackling climate change is the pro-growth strategy for the longer term, and it can be done in a way that does not cap the aspirations for growth of rich or poor countries. The earlier effective action is taken, the less costly it will be. (The Stern Review on the Economics of Climate Change, Cambridge University Press, 2006, pii.)

14. The implications of the Stern Commission’s predictions, for both the developing and developed world, are immense. But, what is sometimes overlooked in this cost-benefit analysis is the understanding that climate change is already impacting disproportionately on many of the world’s poorest communities. The irony of this - not lost on a number of governments in the developing world - is the realisation that climate change is a developed world problem for which the developing world is paying the price. President Museveni of Uganda was the first African leader to describe climate change as an act of aggression by the rich against the poor. He is unlikely to be the last.

15. Western governments are slowly acknowledging their culpability for this situation. In a speech to the United Nations, 31 July 2007, the British Prime Minister, Gordon Brown stated: “We know that the gains from global prosperity have been disproportionately enjoyed by the people in the industrialised countries and that the consequences of climate change will be disproportionately felt by the poorest who are least responsible for it – making the issue of climate change one of justice as much as economic development.”

16. The polarisation between those adversely affected by climate change and those responsible for causing the changes means that climate change is becoming a
major obstacle to continued poverty reduction, with all that that implies for human security. **Climate change threatens to push many communities still further into poverty** and in so doing, frustrate the efforts by the international community to deliver on the Millennium Development Goals. Goals that already looked distant now appear elusive.

17. Acknowledging the painfully slow progress in realising these goals the British Prime Minister expressed the connection in his address to the United Nations, 31 July 2007:

> There is no trade off between meeting our goals on economic development and meeting our goals on the environment and climate change – that tackling poverty is just not possible without also tackling climate change. Indeed economic progress, social justice and environmental care now go together. That is why Millennium Development Goal seven – that we ensure environmental sustainability – is central to what we do.

18. Recognising the linkage between climate change and the Millennium Development Goals underlines the fact that there are very real human costs associated with climate change (See Box 1). **The Stern Report predicted that up to an additional 145-220 million people could be living on less than $2 a day and there could be an additional 165,000-250,000 child deaths per year in South Asia and sub-Saharan Africa by 2100.** Responding to these statistics, Archbishop Desmond Tutu observed, in February 2007: “The human impact of climate change is obvious, but what is not so apparent is the extent to which climatic events can undo the development gains put in place over decades. Droughts and floods destroy lives, but they also destroy schools, economies and opportunity”.

19. Many **developing countries are especially vulnerable to climate change because of their geographic exposure, low incomes and their greater reliance on climate sensitive sectors such as agriculture.** The 2007/08 UNDP report on climate change and human development suggests that changed run-off patterns and glacial melt will add to ecological stress, thereby compromising flows of water for irrigation and human settlements in the process. It estimates that an additional 1.8 billion people could be living in a water-scarce environment by 2080. Increased levels of water stress will have a significant impact on food security in some countries in Africa with yields from rain fed agriculture being reduced by up to 50% by 2020. Drought affected areas in sub-Saharan Africa could expand by 60-90 million hectares, with dry land zones suffering losses of US$26billion by 2060 (2003 prices), a figure in excess of bilateral aid to the region.

20. Falling farm incomes will increase poverty and reduce the ability of households to invest in a better future. If this scenario plays true then it will force households to use up meagre savings just to survive. UNDP estimates that the additional number affected by malnutrition could rise to 600 million by 2080. Left unaddressed this will have a knock-on effect on educational standards as children, especially girls, are withdrawn from school, to assist with securing alternative sources of household income.
BOX 1

The Link Between the Environment and the Millennium Development Goals

1. Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger
   The livelihood strategies of 2 billion poor people, and the food security of most poor people, depend on ecosystems sustaining diverse goods and services. Good management of environmental and natural resources is often essential for economic growth.

2. Achieve universal primary education
   Children, especially girls, collect water and fuel wood, reducing school attendance. Better school sanitation increases attendance by girls.

3. Promote gender equality and empower women
   Poor women suffer indoor air pollution, the burden of collecting water and fuel wood, and unequal access to land and natural resources.

4. Reduce child mortality
   Diarrhoea and respiratory infections are the main killers of children under five. These are strongly linked to unclean water, inadequate sanitation, and air pollution.

5. Improve maternal health
   Indoor air pollution and the burden of carrying water and fuel wood affect women’s health and fitness for safe childbirth.

6. Combat major diseases
   Up to 20% of disease burdens in developing countries are associated with environmental factors. Preventive environmental health measures are as important as health treatment.

7. Ensure environmental sustainability
   About half of the world’s poor live in environmentally fragile rural areas. Environmental degradation must be reversed to sustain environmental services such as water, carbon, nitrogen and nutrient cycling.

8. Develop a global partnership for development
   Many international environmental problems – such as climate change and depletion of major fisheries – can only be solved through partnerships between rich and poor countries.

21. The relationship between food insecurity, malnutrition and health is well documented amongst development experts. Malnutrition is a health outcome in itself, but it also lowers natural resistance to infectious diseases by weakening the immune system. Climate change will potentially exacerbate this vulnerability since changes in temperature and precipitation are likely to increase the geographic range of vector-borne diseases such as malaria, cholera and diarrhoea. This is likely to generate higher morbidity and mortality rates among people, especially children, suffering from malnutrition than among food secure people. UNDP estimates that an additional 220-400 million people could be exposed to malaria – a disease that already claims 1 million lives annually.

22. Although the Millennium Development Goals do not address the issue of migration and conflict, it is easy to see how they could both have an impact on development. The loss of low-lying landmass in coastal areas, which could be ravaged by storms and increases in sea levels, is likely to lead to displacements of populations, loss of life and damage to infrastructure. Rising sea levels could result in 330 million people being permanently or temporarily displaced through flooding. Over 70 million people in Bangladesh, 6 million in Lower Egypt and 22 million in Vietnam could be affected. Small island states could suffer catastrophic damage. The 1 billion people currently living in urban slums on fragile hillsides or flood prone river banks face acute vulnerabilities. In some countries, like Tanzania and Ghana for example, the effect of even a small rise in sea level is already being felt, in the form of fresh water sources contaminated by salt water, and increased coastal erosion.

23. Drought and other climate–related shocks risk sparking violence and conflict. Resource driven conflicts are not new, but in climate change there is a potentially new and deadly dynamic. Studies, such as that undertaken by the Defence Concepts and Doctrine Centre, estimate that a sea level rise of just two centimetres – well within current estimates – would displace two million people from the Nile delta, an area which is currently Egypt’s agricultural heartland. It is difficult to predict what the human and state security implications would be of such a large displacement. But to displace 2 million people from one of the most fragile regions of the world is bound to have a serious impact – not least on Egypt’s internal security and stability.

24. A major contributing factor to the conflict in Darfur - a conflict in which over 250,000 people have already died – has been a shift in rainfall patterns that has put nomadic herders and settled pastoralists into conflict with one another. UNDP reported, June 2007, that deserts had spread southwards by an average of 63 miles over the past four decades. Addressing environmental will not end a conflict which is fundamentally political (Khartoum’s policies) and ethnic (Arab v black Africa), but it will be a vital component in securing any lasting political settlement.

25. The risk of resource related conflicts is also present in other regions of strategic importance. The Middle East, for instance, contains 5% of the world’s population, but only 1% of the world’s water. This ratio will become more unfavourable with climate change. Disagreements between Israel
and its Arab neighbours over water access to the Jordan basin have always been a source of tension. These tensions are likely to increase as climate change causes further depletion to the water basin. It is striking that even now, the question of what constitutes a viable two state solution is as much dependent on resolving disputes over access to natural resources as it is on resolving the status of Jerusalem.

26. None of these separate drivers addressed above will operate in isolation. They will interact with wider social, economic and ecological processes that shape opportunities for human development and provide for human security. The transmission mechanism from climate change to human development and security will vary across and within communities. What is certain, however, is that **dangerous climate change has the potential to deliver powerful systemic shocks to human development across a large number of countries. Many of the human development impacts are likely to prove irreversible.**

27. In a recent report to the March 2008 European Council, the EU’s two most senior foreign policy officials provided a striking synopsis of the challenges that climate change poses to international peace and security. Their report argued that, **although the immediate and devastating effects of global warming will be felt far away from Europe, with the poor suffering disproportionately in south Asia, the Middle East, central Asia, Africa and Latin America, it will be Europe that will ultimately bear the consequences.** This could be in the form of mass migration, destabilisation of parts of the world vital to European security, radicalisation of politics and populations, north-south conflict because of the perceived injustice of the causes and effects of global warming, famines caused by arable land loss, wars over water, energy and other natural resources.

28. Taken together, this paints a picture of a very bleak and messy new world order. The multilateral system which has offered some form of peace and stability through its institutions of global governance is at risk if the international community fails to address the threats posed by climate change. **The impacts of climate change will fuel the politics of resentment between those most responsible for climate change and those most affected by it and it will, by acting as a threat multiplier, deepen political tensions nationally and internationally.** Lest the threats posed by climate change are mere futurology, the UN’s appeals for emergency humanitarian aid in 2007 were all, bar one, connected to climate change.
Chapter Three
Responding to the challenge of dangerous climate change

Strategies for Mitigation

29. The findings of the Stern Committee, alongside successive reports from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), have fuelled a plethora of policy initiatives, nationally, regionally and internationally. Nationally this has seen the British government introduce a Climate Change Bill that aims to reduce CO2 emissions by 26-30% by 2020 and 60% by 2050. Regionally, this has resulted in the European Commission’s proposal in January 2007 to commit the EU to a ‘unilateral’ 20% reduction in greenhouse emissions by 2020, or 30% in the context of a broader international agreement. Agreements such as these contributed to a commitment by the G8 states meeting in Heiligendamm, Germany, to work towards a new international framework on climate change to replace the Kyoto Protocol in 2012. **Common to all these initiatives is the acceptance that global emissions of greenhouse gases need to be stabilised before concentrations reach levels that could cause a 2 degree Celsius rise in global average temperature.**

30. The inter-linkage of these initiatives highlights the complexity of the decision-making process needed to produce a new international regime on climate change. Welcome though it is that the British government has introduced its own Climate Change Bill, British climate policy and the global process resulting in a post-2012 agreement is largely shaped in Brussels, not London. In January 2008 the European Commission announced a legislative programme to meet its ambitious targets for European action on climate change. These proposals will have a dramatic impact on UK policy, especially on renewable energy. Reaching agreement in Brussels on this legislative programme will impact significantly on international negotiations for a successor treaty to the Kyoto Protocol. Europe must use this year to agree policies that deliver on the emissions targets that it preaches to the rest of the world. A successful outcome to these negotiations by the end of 2008 is arguably a pre-requisite for a global agreement in Copenhagen next year.

31. Setting ambitious targets for mitigation is an important first step. Translating targets into deliverable policies is politically more challenging. This requires putting a price on carbon emissions either by directly taxing CO2 emissions or by the introduction of a cap-and-trade system. The second approach, where government set an overall emissions cap and issues tradable allowances that grant business the right to emits a set amount, is currently the favoured solution.

32. The EU’s Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) is currently the world’s largest cap-and-trade system and is seen by many as the prototype for a global carbon market. To date, however, it has promised more than it has delivered. Emission caps have been set far too high, primarily because of EU member states inability to resist the lobbying efforts of powerful vested interests. This has meant that the carbon price has been far too low, so reducing the incentive for companies to invest in innovative green technology. Lessons learnt from the
scheme’s operation to date have informed the European Commission’s proposals for its reform. These proposals are currently being debated by the European Parliament.

33. Uncertainty remains as to how the EU’s-ETS will ultimately be linked with other cap-and-trade schemes. To be sustainable any global carbon market must have the support and the participation of developing countries. To be effective the global carbon market must take account of the tiny carbon emissions of many of the least developed countries, but in a way that does not hinder their own economic growth. As the British Prime Minister acknowledged in his UN address, 31 July 2007, the challenge is to involve the private sector “in designing a global carbon market that genuinely benefits the poor”. **The new low carbon economy must empower the development of many of the poorest countries rather than contributing to their further marginalisation.**

34. A number of mechanisms already exist enabling cap-and-trade systems, like the EU’s-ETS, to work to the benefit of least developed countries. The Kyoto Protocol provides through the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) and the Joint Implementation (JI) scheme for sectors covered under the EU’s-ETS to earn emissions credit by investing in developing countries. A 2007 report by Lehman Brothers, *The Business of Climate Change: Challenges and Opportunities*, indicates that by mid-2007 EU member states had committed to investing 7.5 million Euros by 2012 under the CDM and JI. These investments promise a reduction of more than 2 billion tonnes of carbon dioxide. These mechanisms therefore provide a source of technological transfer to assist developing countries in introducing cleaner energy.

35. A balance needs to be struck, however, between ensuring that access to the CDM market does not undermine the market incentive for companies to invest in green technologies at home by making it cheaper to earn emissions credit by financing the deployment of existing technology overseas. **Investment in CDM projects need to supplement rather than supplant cuts in domestic emissions.** In theory at least it should not matter where the reductions take place as the environmental effect will be the same. In practice, however, it is self defeating when a country, such as Spain, is only able to meet its Kyoto Protocol emissions target by extensive use of the CDM and JI.

36. **Carbon markets are a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for the transition to a low carbon economy. Governments have a critical role to play in setting regulatory standards and in supporting low-carbon research, development and deployment.** The International Energy Agency estimates that the world will need to invest some 21 trillion dollars in the energy sector between now and 2030 and that the bulk of this money has to flow in the direction of low carbon and energy efficient investments. Developing effective carbon pricing through cap and trade system will help stimulate investment in innovation. It will not, however, be sufficient to ensure the commercialisation of new technology such as Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS). With a more active programme of public-private investment aligned with effective carbon pricing, CCS technologies could be developed and
deployed more rapidly. Unfortunately the recent rise in oil prices and growing energy insecurity has led to an explosion of interest in new coal-fired power stations and in coals-to-liquids technology to preserve energy security.

37. It is important that any technological advances are shared broadly across the international community. Governments need to allow developing countries and emerging economies to manufacture patented clean technology so as to help address existing energy shortages and avoid the problem of rapidly rising emissions in these countries as their economies grow. An aggressive approach to climate mitigation will require a concerted effort to develop low-carbon technologies with fast industrialising economies such as China and India. This presents genuine opportunities for new models of technological co-operation which will require changes to the existing intellectual property rights regimes to take account of the public good of these technologies. To decarbonise the global economy effectively, the world will need OECD countries to come up with the technological innovations that are then manufactured by China. This will lower the cost of compliance in the OECD, as Chinese power equipment is typically 30-60% cheaper to purchase, but such a move would help drive China’s low-carbon transformation. Such a development will require a shift in political positions which go against the current rise in protectionist sentiments in the OECD countries.

Adapting to the inevitable

38. Mitigation - and the level at which it is possible to stabilise atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases - will determine the level of climate change impacts felt by developing countries, as it will for the world as a whole. But even if there are immediate and far reaching reductions in greenhouse gas emissions, scientists predict that global temperatures will continue to rise before falling around 2050. Developed countries already recognise the imperative to adapt as illustrated by the national adaptation strategies that OECD governments are drawing up in preparation for more extreme climate patterns. The United Kingdom is spending US$1.2 billion annually on strengthening flood and coastal defence systems. Developing countries face more severe adaptation challenges on account of both the immediacy of the climate challenges that they are already encountering and also because these challenges have to be met by governments operating under severe financial constraints.

39. In a contribution to the 2007/8 UNDP report, Archbishop Desmond Tutu warned that the inequalities revealed by the differing responses to adaption suggested that the world was in danger of drifting into a world of ‘adaptation apartheid’. He writes:

Adaptation is becoming a euphemism for social injustice on global scale. While the citizens of the world are protected from harm, the poor, the vulnerable and the hungry are exposed to the harsh reality of climate change in their everyday lives. Put bluntly the world’s poor are being harmed through a problem that is not of their making. The footprint of the Malawian farmer or the Haitian slum dweller barely registers in the Earth’s atmosphere. No community with a sense of
justice, compassion or respect, for basic human rights should accept the current pattern of adaptation. Leaving the world’s poor to sink or swim with their own meagre resources in the face of the threat posed by climate change is morally wrong. (UNDP 2007/08 Human Development Report, Fighting Climate Change: Human Solidarity in a Divided World, p 22)

40. **Responding to this injustice requires both the urgent mitigation of greenhouse gas emissions and bringing adaption to climate change to the heart of the international poverty agenda.** Adaptation covers a host of issues from ensuring that climate data and predictions are fed into agricultural and health planning to responding to the predicted rises in sea levels by either improving coastal defences or moving large settlements further inland. Adaptation measures can be of different types, from the purely technological (such as sea defence construction), through behaviour changes (such as shifts in choice of food or recreation), managerial (such as changes in farming methods) and policy (such as planning regulations). Adaptation thus encompasses national or regional strategies as well as practical steps taken at a community level or by individuals. Adaptation measures can be anticipatory or reactive. Adaptation applies to natural as well as to human systems.

41. **To secure the necessary levels of adaptation, developing countries will need significant external financial assistance.** The Stern Commission noted: “People will adapt to changes in the climate as far as their resources and knowledge allow. But developing countries lack the infrastructure (most notably in the area of water supply and management), financial means, and access to public services that would otherwise help them adapt”. **This money must not be channelled from existing aid budgets in a way that undermines the international communities’ existing development commitments.** There is a need for urgent action here since adaptation measures will become progressively harder to implement as societies face increasing costs stress from the consequences of climate change.

42. Although there are uncertainties about the long term costs of adaptation, the World Bank has estimated the global cost of adaptation for existing investments in the developing world at between $9-41 billion dollars a year. This investment is needed to fund clean development, technology transfer and alternatives to deforestation in the Global South. Some of this investment will need to come from the market, but a significant proportion has to be public funding. Adaptation is no substitute for development or even an add-on to development. Adaptation cannot be financed from existing development funds. New financial compensatory streams need to be developed. Analysis provided by UNDP warns that one of the fastest growing areas for aid flows has been the diversion of development aid into disaster relief, which accounted for 7.5% of total commitments in 2005. Northern governments have pledged to double aid by 2010, though the record on delivery is mixed. **Additional funds are needed therefore for adaptation to insulate existing aid budgets. Any shortfall in delivery will compromise progress towards the MDGs and compound problems in climate change adaptation.**
43. Progress to date in securing the necessary levels of adaptation funding has been hazardously slow. Several financial mechanisms to support adaptation already exist under the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol. These include the Least Developed Countries Fund, the Special Climate Change Fund, the Adaptation Fund and the Strategic Priority on Adaptation. These four funds contain a total of over US$310 million to date. These multilateral funds are complemented by a number of bilateral funding agencies in countries including Canada, Germany, the Netherlands, Japan, the United Kingdom and the USA that have allocated funding for adaptation activities, including research and some pilot projects. This patchwork of multilateral mechanisms is delivering small amounts of finance with very high transactions costs. To date, bilateral donors have provided around US$110 million for over 50 adaptation projects in 29 countries. To puts this in proper perspective, this figure is less than one half of what the German state of Baden-Wurttemberg will allocate to the strengthening of flood defences.

44. It is self-evident that significant financial resources will be needed in the future to assist developing countries adopt appropriate adaptation and mitigation strategies. The problem, short-term, however, is probably less one of resources and more one of limited absorption capacity which points to an adaptation deficit in many developing countries. For future funding to be effective, adaptation and development policies need to be linked. The main challenge, in the first instance, is to mainstream or integrate climate issues into government policy making and into donor planning. Developing countries, for instance, need to factor into their plans for further investment in public health infrastructure the increased threat of natural disasters and growing water stress. Similarly, development programmes and policies have the potential, if properly targeted, to influence the ability of developing countries to adapt to climate change. For example, policies for forest conservation and sustainable energy will, if correctly targeted and implemented, enhance the resilience of communities and thereby reduce the vulnerability of their livelihoods to climate change.

45. At present such adaptive efforts have been hindered by a lack of data as to the vulnerabilities and priorities for adaptation of a number of least developed countries. In sub-Saharan Africa for instance, high levels of rural poverty and dependence on rain-fed agriculture makes meteorological information an imperative for adaptation. However, the region has the world’s lowest density of meteorological stations. In France, the meteorological budget amounts to US$388 million annually, compared with just US$2 million for Ethiopia. The 2005 G8 Summit pledged action to strengthen Africa’s meteorological monitoring capacity, but follow up has fallen far short of the commitments made.

46. Where data exists, it tends to be very approximate and top-down rather than based on disaggregated estimates. Steps are being taken to correct this imbalance as illustrated by the joint venture between the Department for International Development and the Canadian International Development Research Centre to investigate how African Countries can adapt to change. Yet such research, while helpful, is piecemeal and top-down. The international
community needs to assist developing countries to engage more, not only in global climate observations and modelling through the Global Climate Observation System (GCOS), but in smaller regional modelling that can provide location specific results. Based on such predictions, a better mapping of vulnerabilities can be undertaken – establishing which coastal areas are likely to suffer from a rise in sea level, which diseases are likely to be more prevalent and where they might be concentrated and, what crops are likely to face declining yields, for example.

**Securing a Just and Equitable Post-2012 Treaty**

47. The overwhelming scientific consensus that climate change is both real and man-made has meant that climate scepticism which was prevalent 10 years ago is increasingly a fringe activity. Following the analysis provided by the Stern Review, most governments recognise that solutions to climate change are affordable – or at least more affordable than the costs of inaction. The gathering political momentum has resulted in many governments setting bold targets for cutting greenhouse gas emissions. Despite these positive developments, practical outcomes have been less impressive. Governments may recognise the realities of global warming, but political action continues to fall short of the minimum needed to resolve the climate crisis. Some governments have yet to set reduction targets, while others have yet to introduce the measures necessary to achieve those targets. The gap between scientific evidence and political action remains stark. This gap is indicative of the lack of a clear, credible and long-term multilateral framework to address the problem. With the current commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol due to expire in 2012, the international community has an opportunity to agree such a framework.

48. Negotiations for a successor to the Kyoto Protocol started at the COP-13 in Bali, 3 December 2007. These negotiations are scheduled to conclude in Copenhagen at the COP-15 in December 2009. Despite agreeing a ‘Bali Roadmap’ to guide negotiations over the next two years, the international community is still some way short of reaching a consensus on the post-2012 climate regime. Recognising that securing a stable climate is a global public good will not be sufficient to achieve a robust settlement. A gaping chasm still divides countries on crucial questions: Who should have to reduce emissions? How much? When? Who should pay for adaptation to the impacts of climate change and how much should they pay? Closer examination of this divide suggests that rich and poor countries have diametrically opposed perceptions of ‘climate justice’ or what constitutes a just and equitable settlement.

49. Western scientists tend to be mystified as to why this life threatening issue has elicited such an anaemic policy response, but many of them miss the point: responses to climate change are bound up with other social and economic issues facing nations and are fundamentally about inequality and injustice. A country’s understanding of equity and justice is itself a social construct reflecting its own relative economic and political power within the international system. What a country considers ‘fair’ and ‘just’ gives rise to
causal beliefs, principled beliefs, and world-views that in turn lead to polarised preferences and divergent expectations. The situation is complicated further by the recognition the impact of climate change is likely to create new vulnerabilities, the causes and distribution of which are unfair.

50. Central to both the 1992 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and the subsequent 1997 Kyoto Protocol is the foundation principle of “common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities”. This principle remains central to the post-2012 negotiations. The experience of past environmental negotiations illustrates, however, that securing agreement in principle has been easier than concretising the principle in action. From the outset, global environmental negotiations have been characterised by high levels of preference heterogeneity and deep discord. **Even when rich and poor countries can agree on general fairness principles, or even a framework negotiating document such as the ‘Bali Roadmap’ the heterogeneity of the preferences generated by global inequality aggravates disagreements about how to make those principles operational.**

51. To summarise, Bali negotiations are taking place in the context of an ongoing development crisis and what the Global South perceives as a pattern of Northern callousness and opportunism in matters of international political economy. The negotiations are take place at a time when the concerns of poor nations regarding fair processes and fair outcomes have frequently been marginalised. The Millennium Development Goals, and with it the commitment to cut poverty in half by 2015, now look elusive, while the projected dividends to be accrued from the Doha Trade Round have yet to be finalised and distributed. This sense of injustice is compounded when wealthy nations appear to flout environmental treaties by failing to cut emissions, resist limits on their conspicuous consumption, fail to transfer promised technology and environmental assistance and seemingly undermine developing countries’ right to development in the short and long-term.

52. **Developed countries have to take the lead in cutting emissions. They carry the burden of historic responsibility for the climate change problem, and they have the financial resources and technological capabilities to initiate deep and early cuts in emissions.** Establishing a carbon price through cap-and-trade systems is a start, but market pricing will not be sufficient. The development of a regulatory systems and public private partnerships for a low carbon transition are also priorities. This is not to imply that developing countries should do nothing. **Any multilateral agreement without the active participation of major emitters in the developing world would be meaningless.** Yet securing their participation will require agreement on mechanisms for finance and technological transfers to facilitate the rapid disbursement of the low carbon technologies needed to avoided dangerous climate change. Harnessing the power of globalisation to assist this process will require major changes to existing intellectual property right regimes to take account of the public good of technologies such as carbon capture and storage.
However, basic principles of equity, and the human development imperative of expanding access to energy, demand that developing countries have the flexibility to make the transition to a low carbon growth path at a rate consistent with their capabilities. The provision of existing technologies can help to ensure that these development pathways are sustainable. However, adaptation priorities must also be addressed. For far too long, climate change adaptation has been treated as a peripheral concern rather than as a core part of the international poverty reduction agenda. Poor countries cannot be expected to fend for themselves on the limited resource they have, while rich countries protect their citizens behind climate-defence fortifications. Taking seriously the adaptation concerns of developing countries will require new financial streams rather than the recycling of old money from already under resourced poverty alleviation strategies.
Chapter Four
What might an Effective Church Response to Climate Change Look Like?

54. The previous chapters of this report have demonstrated that climate change is both an ‘environmental’ protection issue, and also one intimately connected with the political dimensions of the world. Given the scale and urgency of the challenge, many of the decisions critical for global climate security and the effective transition to a low carbon, high-efficiency economy will take place outside the field of climate change. It is the decisions made in the areas of foreign and trade policy, security and geopolitics, energy policy and investments that will have an influence on the global response to climate change.

55. As the implications of climate change become more noticeable, and as negotiations make progress to secure a way forward in a post-2012 world, climate change related issues, which were once marginal and peripheral concerns to international decision makers, are becoming an ever larger part of the agenda. How then should the Church respond to and contribute to the shaping of this the new agenda?

56. The answer depends in part on the Church understanding that the connections between climate change and other issues are not only a driver for action, but also a necessary part of the response. The following section looks in greater detail at the steps that the Church needs to take to frame its response in a way that will have traction with the wider political community.

57. If the Church wishes to drive this agenda forward then it needs to connect climate change with other issues and to then formulate its own response in a way, which can achieve multiple aims. This requires mainstreaming climate change into the wider mission of the Church, not least by recognising more clearly the inter-linkage between the Church’s calling “to strive to safeguard the integrity of creation and sustain and renew the life of the earth” and its mission to “to seek to transform unjust structures of society”.

58. All too often the Church compartmentalises the Five Marks of Mission in a way that defeats the transforming power of God’s promise of salvation. The Five Marks of Mission were not written with the intention of inviting the Church to adopt a supermarket ‘pick-and-mix’ approach to mission. Nor were they written in order of importance. Taken together, in a way that recognises their interdependence, they provide a holistic understanding of what the Church’s mission entail. Making more visible the connection between environmental degradation and human security ought therefore to strengthen the Church’s mission.
The Five Marks of Mission

To proclaim the Good News of the Kingdom
To teach, baptise and nurture new believers
To respond to human need by loving service
To seek to transform unjust structures of society
To strive to safeguard the integrity of creation and sustain and renew the life of the earth


59. Understanding the Church’s mission holistically is not only a theological imperative but also a practical necessity. The emergence of specialised portfolios of work around each of the Marks of Mission, backed up by relevant self-supporting networks, at a diocesan, national and Communion level, can all too easily raise barriers inhibiting collaborative work. If it is accepted that climate change cuts across a range of policy issues at both the national and international level, then it makes little sense to restrict the Church’s response to climate change to the environmental dimension. **Climate change requires a policy response not only in the field of the environment but also in areas such as social cohesion, immigration, urbanisation, industrial mission, sustainable development and rural affairs, all of which are driven by the mission imperative to make God’s ways known upon the Earth.** Resolving this issue is not a matter of asking already over-burdened theological colleges to look again at how they teach theology. Rather, it is about being open to new ways in which the Church lives out its mission.

The Church as an Advocate for Change

60. The mission of the Church is to work with God to bring about his Kingdom. This Kingdom is proclaimed in the ‘good news’ of Jesus Christ and is characterised by social justice; reconciliation with God, fellow human beings and creation; peace and God’s material blessings. The Church has many roles through which it fulfils its mission and a number of them relate to advocacy. These include prayer for God to intervene; modelling an alternative that can influence others; seeking social justice through influencing those in power; bringing peace and reconciliation, and a prophetic role in speaking out against injustice. For the Church this advocacy is not for selfish gain, but part of working with God to bring about His Kingdom, with a particular focus on the poor and the marginalised who are shown in the gospels to be God’s special concern amongst humanity. As Proverbs 8:31 reminds us, the Church is called to “speak up for those who cannot speak themselves, for the right of all who are destitute.”

61. The Church of England is actively involved in articulating and advocating fresh thinking in the area of climate change. At a national level, the Lords Spiritual have played a constructive and at times pivotal role in pushing through amendments to the government’s Climate Change Bill. These
interventions reflected the concerns set out in the submission from the Mission and Public Affairs Council to the government’s May 2007 White Paper. The bishops have also worked closely with advisors at Lambeth Palace, with the Christian development agencies Tearfund and Christian Aid and with Peers in bringing Amendments for debate. Working with others, the bishops secured an Amendment to the Bill requiring companies to report their greenhouse gas emissions. A further Amendment has ensured that the proposed Climate Change Committee takes into consideration when setting budgets and emissions how climate change impacts upon the worlds poor.

62. At a European level, climate change has featured heavily on the agenda of the House of Bishops’ Europe Panel. In March 2008, the Panel made a submission to the European Commission’s fundamental review of the EU budget. The Panel argued: “Faced by the global challenge of climate change, the EU budget should be refocused in support of low carbon growth both within the EU’s borders and beyond.” In June 2008, the Bishops’ Panel made two further submissions: first, on the question of renewable energy and; second on the Commission’s proposals to reform the EU’s ETS. Further details regarding these submissions can be found on the Church of England’s website (http://www.cofe.anglican.org/info/socialpublic/europe).

63. Where possible the Bishops’ Panel has sought to work ecumenically. In a joint visit with bishops from the Church of Sweden and the EKD in November 2007, the Bishops’ Panel pressed the European Commission to take seriously the developmental concerns of many of the poorest countries in the negotiations for a successor Treaty to the Kyoto Protocol. As part of the process of developing a European religious leaders’ platform on climate change, the Bishops’ Europe Panel pressed the Commission President’s to focus the next annual dialogue meeting between religious leaders and the EU Institutions on climate change. This meeting took place on 5 May 2008. As a follow up to this meeting the Bishops’ Europe Panel is pressing for the establishment of a Climate Change Contact Group to help structure the dialogue between the European Commission and European churches and faith communities.

64. The appointment of Canon Dr Gary Wilton, as the Church of England’s Representative to the EU Institutions, April 2008, with climate change specifically included in his brief, means that the Church is well placed to work with the other churches in influencing the shape of subsequent debates about the EU’s legislative process on climate change, not least current proposals for reforming the Emissions Trading Scheme. This has, for example, involved meeting with relevant MEPs from the European Parliament’s Climate Change Committee to press home the points made by the Bishops’ Europe Panel in its earlier submission.

65. At an international level, the Archbishop of Canterbury has contributed to public policy debates concerning the scope of the successor Treaty to the Kyoto Protocol. In a joint letter, November 2007, with the Archbishop of Sweden and Bishop Huber, the Chair of the EKD Council, the Archbishop wrote to European Heads of Government and the EU institutions arguing that
securing a just and equitable post-2012 Treaty depends on governments progressing beyond particularistic notions of justice that reflect their own national interests to one that provides for the global common good. This letter was followed up by the Archbishop of Canterbury producing a DVD on climate justice for delegates attending the COP-13 in Bali, December 2007.

66. As the negotiations intensify for a successor Treaty to the Kyoto Protocol, the Church of England, in partnership with other European churches and faith communities, has an important role to play in encouraging Heads of Government to secure an equitable post-2012 agreement of sufficient ambition to avoid dangerous climate change. This involves more than just monitoring and influencing the international negotiations, it entails working with others to ensure the secure foundations of an international agreement at a national and European level. In taking forward this work, the Church needs to help reshape the climate change debate from being a purely environmental issue to a moral and religious one.

67. Despite this impressive work, often done with few resources, it is clear that there is still room for improvement. In November 2007, the UK’s Environment Agency conducted a survey of 25 leading environmentalists from businesses, NGOs, the media, think tanks and its own organisation, asking them to list the 50 things that really could save the planet. ‘A Leap of Faith’ was listed as the second most important thing. The poll notes: “The appeal comes through loud and clear – religious leaders need to make the planet their priority. The world’s faith groups have been silent for too long on the environmental. It is time that they fulfilled their rightful collective role in reminding us that we have a duty to restore and maintain the ecological balance of the planet”.

68. The opinion poll illustrates both the high expectations that many within the policy community have as to the influence of religious leaders, but also the worrying perception that they aren’t doing enough. How might the Church of England communicate its climate change work more effectively? Acknowledging that it is unlikely that further financial resources will be made available to promote the Church of England’s work in this area, the Church nationally must appraise how the existing resources that are thinly spread might be more effectively coordinated and integrated. In the first instance further consideration needs to be given to developing an integrated communications strategy involving both the Mission and Public Affairs Division and the Communications Unit.

69. Efforts to better integrate the church’s climate change work nationally needs to be mirrored by similar efforts locally. Some progress has been made in this area as illustrated by a one-day conference held on 8 May 2008. Organised by the Mission and Public Affairs Division, the conference brought together relevant diocesan networks and officers (social responsibility officers, diocesan environmental officers, world mission officers, world development advisors etc). It became clear during the day that while each of the networks and officers are working on climate change in their own particular way, there were tensions between them which impeded collaborative working. If the Church is to make an effective contribution to the climate change debate, steps need
to be taken to better manage the human resources at its disposal. To facilitate this process the Mission and Public Affairs Division is now producing a regular newsletter to dioceses, *The Bloomsbury Newsletter*, with the intention of sharing best practice between networks. The Division is open to the idea of organising similar events and training days in the future, but these efforts will count for nothing if ways of working locally and at a diocesan level impede collaborative partnerships.

**Recommendation 1:** Request that the Mission and Public Affairs Division and the Communications Unit work together in developing an integrated communications strategy for the Archbishops’ Council on climate change that helps sustain and promote future work in this area.

**Recommendation 2:** Request that dioceses review their existing climate change work and take all necessary steps to encourage greater collaboration between relevant diocesan officers/networks.

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**Campaigning for Change**

70. The Church of England has sought to respond to the scandal of poverty by pressing for further international action on debt, trade and aid. This social justice agenda has seen the Church playing an active role in the Jubilee 2000 Campaign, the Trade Justice Movement and MakePovertyHistory. Yet, as Professor Richard Odingo, the Vice Chair of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, acknowledged: “Climate change will make it impossible for the world to achieve the Millennium Development Goals. Poverty will increase. Food security is bound to get worse.” Or, as Nazmul Chowdhury of Practical Action rather more bluntly put it: “Forget about making poverty history. Climate change will make poverty permanent”.

71. There are a number of campaigns offering vehicles for Christian mobilisation in the field of climate change. Environmental NGOs such as Greenpeace, Friends of the Earth and the WWF have considerable expertise in this area. As evidence emerges as to the impact that climate change has on the poorest communities of the world, development agencies such as Christian Aid, Tearfund and Oxfam have also launched related campaigns. In addition a number of ecumenical bodies such as the Christian Ecology Link, Eco-Congregations, A Rocha and the European Christian Environment Network, as well as the climate specific ecumenical campaign Operation Noah are also active in this area.

72. Many of these same organisations are also members of the *Stop Climate Chaos* campaign which was established on 1 September 2005. Following the pattern of *Jubilee 2000* and *MakePovertyHistory*, *Stop Climate Chaos* brings together under one umbrella development and environment NGOs and civil society movements with a view to campaigning for changes to government policy on climate change both at home and abroad to prevent global warming exceeding the widely-accepted danger threshold of 2 degrees Celsius. In view of this coalescing of interest and activity around *Stop Climate Chaos*, it is
recommended that the Archbishops’ Council becomes a corporate member of this campaign in the same way that it did with the Jubilee 2000, the Trade Justice Movement and MakePovertyHistory. If the Synod votes for this proposal it would give immense encouragement and support to Christians throughout the Church, who see campaigning as an important component of Christian witness, that the Church is supportive of their efforts and is actively involved with others in a wider campaign against environmental degradation and social injustice. It would also provide greater public visibility to the Church’s work in this area and offer the opportunity for the Church nationally to develop creative partnerships with others.

Recommendation 3: Request that the Archbishops’ Council explore the feasibility of becoming a corporate member of the Stop Climate Chaos campaign for an initial period of three years with the option for continued membership for a further three years following an evaluation of the work of Stop Climate Chaos.

Beyond Mitigation to Adaptation

73. Following the General Synod motion in 2005, encouraging all diocese and parishes to reduce their consumption by a measurable amount, the Church of England launched its national Shrinking the Footprint (StF) campaign in June 2006. This campaign has seen the Church move beyond just measuring its carbon footprint – calculated as being on a par with a major supermarket chain – to actively introducing energy saving measures to reduce this footprint. StF remains a work in process as illustrated by the ongoing work that the Church is doing with the Carbon Trust’s Carbon Management Programme to refine the footprint data for cathedrals and churches, and to look at some specific, practical, solutions for these, frequently historic, buildings. Further information regarding this and other StF can be found at the following web-link: http://www.shrinkingthefootprint.cofe.anglican.org/

74. The work that the Church has done through StF to set its own house in order has enabled it to show, with some integrity, the steps that organisations can take to live more simply. This in turn has provided the basis for creative partnership with others as illustrated by its membership of Together. Together is a campaign organised by The Climate Group, an international charity working with business and government to combat climate change. Together works by enhance consumer engagement in green issues – promoting practical steps everyone can do, which also aims to make everyday lives easier and more affordable. The campaign is supported by a number of leading companies including Tesco, M&S, O2, Sky, British Gas, B&Q, Barclaycard, More Than, National Express, the National Trust, WWF and Coca-Cola.

75. Alongside efforts to mitigate the Church’s carbon footprint, consideration has been given to how, under the umbrella of StF, the Church might compensate for its remaining footprint by financing international adaptation projects. Some dioceses are already responding to this challenge. The Diocese of Wakefield, for example, has sought through its companion link with the Diocese of Mara
in Tanzania to offset its remaining carbon footprint by helping to finance the Mara Tree Project. Similarly, the Lambeth Palace-based Anglicans in Development is funding an ecological project in the Diocese of Burundi that aims to use Church schools as a vehicle for wider social mission. This project alongside an adaptation project in Bangladesh will be recipients of funds raised as result of the decision to make the Lambeth Conference a carbon neutral conference.

76. **There is ample scope here for the Church to build on such initiatives by developing a wider programme of work around adaptation as it has developed in the field of mitigation.** Over the course of the last 8 months the Mission and Public Affairs Division has held a number of conversations with outside agencies, including Christian Aid and Tearfund, about best to take forward this idea. These conversations have concluded with the recommendation that the Archbishops’ Council should work towards the establishment of a hybrid version of the adaptation scheme, *My Global Impact*, currently being developed by Tearfund.

77. Tearfund’s *My Global Impact* invites individuals, households and organisations to calculate their annual carbon dioxide emission using a simple, easy to use carbon calculator. Once people know how much they use over and above the global average, they are then asked to donate for anything over their fair share of the global carbon ‘cake’ (4.3 tonnes). The money accrued from this exercise is then used to fund projects to help poor communities adapt to climate change and to gain access to clean energy. Unlike a number of other initiatives this is not just a money-raising initiative: a strong component of the scheme is to ask people to commit to reducing their emissions as much as they can, and also to make a financial compensation for anything over their fair share of the global average.

78. The discussions to date between the Mission and Public Affairs Division and Tearfund have proceeded on the grounds that the operational mechanics of the initiative would remain the same as *My Global Impact*. It would differ in that while it would be a co-branded initiative, the scheme would be marketed and packaged for a specifically Church of England audience. Any funds generated would be restricted in the first instance to adaptation projects with Anglican partners from around the Communion.

79. The initiative would be web based providing a link from the current StF calculator where churches and individuals can calculate how much money they would need to donate based on their existing carbon footprint. The website would provide regular up-dates on how the money is being allocated with examples of project work. The website would be the means to inform participants of progress and to encourage people to take further action such as campaigning, as they feel appropriate. The website would provide downloadable resources for churches and individuals to assist with further theological and spiritual reflection on this issue.

80. Tearfund would remain responsible for the management of the fund and its administration. In addition to using the funds raised to leverage in additional
outside resources, Tearfund would be responsible for ensuring the good management of individual Anglican Communion adaptation projects and for ensuring that dioceses and parishes were regularly kept abreast of the good news resulting from this work. Tearfund would be responsible for meeting the initial start up costs, but subsequent costs would be met from the fund itself. This arrangement would ensure that all financial liability for the initiative rested with Tearfund. The scheme would be run and managed from Tearfund’s office in Teddington not from Church House.

81. This initiative would be marketed in the first instance to those dioceses, parishes and organisations that have participated in the StF campaign. It would, however, also be open to individuals, families and households. The Mission and Public Affairs Division would provide assistance to Tearfund in drawing up an appropriate marketing strategy and for helping to raise awareness of the scheme amongst target constituencies. The amount of staff time that is devoted to this issue will be determined by the Mission and Public Affairs Director in consultation with the Mission and Public Affairs Council.

82. **It is important to stress that this initiative would be a voluntary one. There would be no compulsion to participate, although it is hoped that the scheme will be favourably received by all dioceses and parishes.** The scheme would run for an initial five year period with a review after the third year and an option for renewal in the fifth year. The decision to run the scheme over five years reflects the importance of ensuring that any project work is sustainable.

83. The Mission and Public Affairs Division believe that the scheme meets a number of key criteria particularly transparency, mutual accountability, partnership, stewardship and ownership. Combining the networks and resources that the Church has at its disposal with the development expertise and administrative capacity of Tearfund, a leading Christian based NGO, is a creative way of building on the success of Shrinking the Footprint. **Whilst it provides for Church’s ownership, it would be a visible demonstration of the Church of England taking seriously the adaptation concerns of many of its partner churches from around the Anglican Communion, giving practical effect to our interdependence within the body of Christ.** If the Synod votes for this proposal, the final practicalities can be resolved and it is hoped that the scheme will be launched in the autumn following the Lambeth Conference.

**Recommendation 4: Welcome and endorse the steps taken so far by the Mission and Public Affairs Division to establish a Church adaptation scheme and request that the General Synod be kept informed of subsequent progress.**